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THE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
FOR STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
David M. Driesen* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A host of environmental problems have international dimensions. 
The United States's climate may depend in part on how much de-
forestation occurs in the Amazon jungle. 1 The ozone layer, which 
protects the earth's surface from ultraviolet rays, will survive only 
if many countries cut back on their production and use of chlorofluo-
rocarbons (CFCS). 2 Growing recognition of the fact that one nation's 
environmentally destructive practices can threaten the ecology and 
even the survival of another nation has led and will continue to lead 
to the growth of international environmental law. 3 The United States 
• Project Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington, D.C. J.D., Yale Law 
School, 1989; Mus., Yale School of Music, 1983; B. Mus., Oberlin Conservatory of Music, 1980. 
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1 See Henry W. Mcgee, Jr., & Kurt Zimmerman, The Deforestation of the Brazilian 
Amazon: Law, Politics and International Cooperation, 21 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 
513, 519-20 (1990). See generally 22 U.S.C. § 2151p-l(a) (1988). 
2 See generally Elizabeth P. Barratt-Brown, Building a Monitoring a,nd Compliance Re-
gime Under the Montreal Protocol, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 261 (1989); John W. Kindt & Samuel 
P. Menetee, The Vexing Problem of Ozone Depletion hi International Environmental Law & 
Policy, 24 TEX. INT'L L. J. 261 (1989); Nancy D. Adams, Comment, Title VI of the 1990 
Clean Air Act Amendments and State and Local Initiatives to Reverse the Stratospheric 
Ozone Crisis: An Analysis of Preemption, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 173 (1991); Joel A. 
Mintz, Comment, Progress Toward a Healthy Sky: An Assessment of the London Amend-
ments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 YALE J. INT'L 
L. 571 (1991). 
3 See generally Note, Developments-International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L. 
REV. 1484 (1991). This Article uses the term "international environmental law" to include 
international agreements and state practice responding to environmental problems affecting 
more than one country. Environmental problems include problems of pollution, global warming 
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has been a leader in environmental law, and international environ-
mental issues have become the subject of our foreign policy.4 Con-
sequently, Congress and the President have begun to clash in the 
international environmental area and will probably clash more often 
in the future. 
Because of the proliferation of federal statutes addressing inter-
national environmental issues, many of these quarrels will center on 
disagreements over statutory interpretation.5 The United States 
Supreme Court's 1986 ruling that questions regarding the interpre-
tation of international environmental statutes6 are justiciable even 
and endangered species. This definition of international environmental law excludes law aimed 
at promoting conservation of resources in order to promote orderly international trade and 
relations, such as most fisheries agreements. Id. at 1500. 
4 See Philip Shabecoff, The Environment As a Diplomatic Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 
1987, at A24. 
5 Questions involving the interpretation of international environmental statutes already 
have begun to flood the courts. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 
478 U.S. 221 (1986) (interpreting statute that requires Secretary of Commerce to sanction 
acts diminishing effectiveness of international fisheries agreements); Kokechik Fishermen's 
Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 839 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (controversy over denial of 
incidental take permit under Marine Mammal Protection Act), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004 
(1989); United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121 (6th Cir. 1985) (criminal conviction under 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act does not require scienter); Man Hing Ivory & Imports, Inc. v. 
Deukmejian, 702 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1983) (preemption of California law forbidding trade in 
certain animal products under Endangered Species Act); Defenders of Wildlife, Inc. v. En-
dangered Species Scientific Auth., 659 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (challenge to export regula-
tions pertaining to bobcats under Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora and implementing legislation), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 963 (1981), 
vacated, 725 F.2d 726 (1984); Hopson v. Kreps, 622 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1980) (challenge to 
Commerce Department regulations implementing International Whaling Commission sched-
ule); United States v. Molt, 599 F.2d 1217 (3rd Cir. 1979) (Lacey Act violation cannot be based 
on foreign revenue law); Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (claim that statutes 
recognizing Eskimo land rights required Secretary of State to object to International Whaling 
Commission quota); United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that 
criminal sanctions under Marine Mammal Protection Act do not apply to takings within another 
country's territorial sea); United States v. 3210 Crusted Sides of Caiman Crocodilius Yacare, 
636 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (civil forfeiture case against foreign importer of animal 
hides); Carpenter v. Andrus, 485 F. Supp. 320 (D. Del. 1980) (controversy over imported 
leopard skin under Endangered Species Act); see also Balelo v. Baldridge, 724 F.2d 753 (9th 
Cir.) (Fourth Amendment challenge to use of observers on fishing boats to enforce Marine 
Mammal Protection Act), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984). 
6 "International environmental statutes" include laws aimed at affecting the environmental 
practices of a foreign nation in United States territorial waters, on the high seas, or in its 
own territory. See, e.g., Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988); 
Driftnet Impact Monitoring, Assessment and Control Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-220, 101 
Stat. 1477 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1822 (1988)); Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801~1882 (1988); Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-
1222 (1988), 46 U.S.C. § 391a (1988); International Environmental Protection Act of 1983, 22 
U.S.C. § 2151 (1988). They also include statutes implementing international agreements. See, 
e.g., Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1988); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 
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if they touch upon foreign policy7 means that courts will have to face 
these quarrels over statutory interpretation. 
This Article focuses on the question of how courts should interpret 
international environmental statutes that might impinge on the Pres-
ident's foreign affairs power. In particular, it asks whether a court 
should avoid overruling executive action in foreign affairs absent a 
"plain statement" in the text of such a statute that unmistakably 
precludes the challenged executive action. This question has become 
important because the Supreme Court's recent cases involving the 
President's foreign affairs power tacitly have departed from the rule 
requiring deference to congressional intent when that intent clearly 
is established through a statute's text and legislative history.8 By 
paying deference to executive branch interpretations of unambigu-
ous legislation, the Court has gone beyond the rule of Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. requiring 
deference to administrative agency interpretations of ambiguous 
statutes. 9 
This tacit departure from the norms of statutory interpretation 
allows the Court to evade constitutional questions about the distri-
bution of powers, to avoid embarrassing the President by limiting 
§ 1531 (1988); Lacey Act,16 U.S.C. §§ 3371--3378 (1988) (implementing Convention on Inter-
national Trade in Endangered Species, Mar. 3, 1973,27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249). In 
addition, many domestic environmental statutes have sections that require consultations with 
foreign governments about domestic environmental regulations having international affects. 
See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. Other statutes request or require the President 
to negotiate international agreements regarding specific environmental matters. See infra 
notes 82-87 and accompanying text. 
7 See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 229--30 (1986). 
8 See Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759, 2770 (1990) (rejecting 
Interstate Commerce Commission's negotiated rate policy as inconsistent with Interstate 
Commerce Act); Immigration and Naturalization Servo v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 
(1987) (using legislative history and statutory language to overrule administrative interpre-
tation of asylum requirements); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter 
... "). See generally Nicholas Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: 
Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295 (1990). 
9 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. The Chevron Court concluded that neither the Clean Air 
Act nor its legislative history showed any Congressional intent on whether the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) could treat an entire plant as a "stationary source" under the Act. 
Id. at 851. It deferred to the agency's statutory interpretation, but commented that deference 
would not be appropriate if Congress had spoken to the question at issue. Id. at 842-43. Some 
commentators have criticized deference to administrative agencies even when the statute 
interpreted is ambiguous. See, e.g., Sanford Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the 
Balance of Powers in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757 (1991) (examines judicial 
deference to executive branch action in environmental foreign policy in the face of contrary 
congressional intent); Eric M. Braun, Note, Coring the Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretation 
of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 986 (1987). 
290 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 19:287 
its freedom of action, and to make legal rules governing foreign 
affairs into flexible instruments of the President's policy. Neverthe-
less, this Article argues that a proper understanding of the extent 
of congressional power in the international environmental area, the 
nature and function of legislation in this area, the political processes 
that normally resolve environmental separation of powers questions, 
and the courts' role in this context preclude extraordinary deference 
to executive actions when a relevant statute governs those actions. 
Section II argues that the Constitution gives Congress broad 
power to regulate international environmental affairs. This power 
extends so far as to allow congressional legislation to overrule ex-
ecutive agreements in this area. Section III describes the role of 
federal legislation in addressing environmental problems. While 
most federal legislation leaves the executive branch a significant 
amount of latitude to conduct environmental foreign affairs, Con-
gress occasionally has attempted to regulate the international envi-
ronment in much the same way it regulates the domestic environ-
ment: by imposing sanctions on wrongdoers. Statutes of this type 
pose special problems because they may replace presidential discre-
tion in foreign affairs with a mandatory duty to impose on a foreign 
party a sanction to which that party did not agree in multilateral or 
bilateral negotiations. Unilateral action nonetheless can be an effec-
tive tool in foreign affairs. Courts interpreting such statutes should 
recognize that the efficacy of unilateral action depends heavily upon 
even-handed predictable enforcement. 
Section IV examines the implications of Congress's role in inter-
national environmental affairs for statutory interpretation. It argues 
that the Supreme Court's statutory interpretation in foreign affairs 
generally, and in international environmental affairs in particular, 
has been unduly deferential to the executive branch. Section IV 
relies upon Section II's discussion of the constitutional bases of 
presidential and congressional power and Section Ill's examination 
of federal statutes' role in international environmental affairs in 
order to criticize the Court's extreme deference as inimical both to 
an appropriate balance of power between the President and Con-
gress and to the development of international environmental law. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO REGULATE THE INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
Because Congress's powers to regulate the international environ-
ment are extensive, they tend to conflict with the President's broad 
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but ill-defined power to conduct foreign affairs. Congressional au-
thority in the area of international environmental affairs derives 
from the Constitution's text, while the President's power in this area 
derives from custom and the broad dicta in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export COrp.1O Thus, the assumption, that the President's 
foreign affairs power is plenary is more problematic in international 
environmental affairs than it would be, for example, with regard to 
the exercise of the War Powers, an area in which the Constitution 
assigns the President a role as commander-in-chief, or the recogni-
tion of foreign governments, an area in which the President has the 
power to receive ambassadors. 11 
The absence of any textual basis for the President's power over 
international environmental affairs suggests that federal statutes 
even should supersede sole executive agreements in this area. All 
in all, congressional power over international environmental affairs 
appears superior to that of the executive branch. 
A. Congressional Powers to Regulate the International 
Environment 
The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate interna-
tional commerce,12 "punish ... offenses against the law of nations, "13 
and ratify treaties. 14 Pursuant to its international commerce clause 
power, Congress has passed legislation restricting imports to protect 
marine mammals and endangered species,15 discouraging the funding 
of deforestation through foreign aid expenditures,16 regulating the 
10 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
11 Environmental issues, in theory, can impinge upon the President's authority in these 
areas. This has not yet occurred in international environmental affairs as this Article defines 
the term. If cases arise in the international arena that implicate an enumerated presidential 
power, then the analysis would be more complicated than in a "pure" environmental case. The 
analysis of problems implicating the president's power as commander-in-chief, for example, 
would have to include questions relating to the scope of presidential power in that area. This 
Article addresses only international environmental affairs that do not involve the President's 
enumerated powers. 
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
13 Id. cl. 10. The full text of the clause grants Congress the power "[t]o define and punish 
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations." Id. 
In modern terms, this clause gives Congress the power to define and punish violations of 
international law. 
,. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
15 See, e.g., Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1362, 1371-1384, 1401-
1407 (1988); Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (1988); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1531-1543 (1988). 
16 See 1986 Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2101p-1 (1988). 
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killing of endangered marine mammals in United States waters, 17 
and threatening unilateral imposition of standards on oil tankers in 
the absence of an international agreement adequately protecting 
against oil spills. 18 Acts punishing importers of animal products made 
from species defined as endangered in foreign laws and the Conven-
tion in Trade of Endangered Species19 and reducing fishing alloca-
tions of those who violate international agreements20 involve not just 
Congress's international commerce power, but also its power to 
punish offenses against the law of nations. 
Congress also has exercised its power to ratify treaties in the 
international environmental area. For example, it recently ratified 
the Montreal Protocol, which aims to protect the earth's ozone layer 
from CFCS.21 Of course, the President also has broad powers in the 
area of foreign affairs and has used them to address international 
environmental problems. 
B. The President's Foreign Affairs Power 
The Constitution explicitly bestows only a few modest foreign 
affairs powers upon the President, while granting Congress quite 
extensive authority.22 Nevertheless, in Curtiss-Wright,23 the United 
States Supreme Court declared that the President has "plenary and 
exclusive power . . . as the sole organ of the federal government in 
the field of international relations."24 
This sweeping statement is pure dictum. Curtiss-Wright did not 
involve a challenge to the President's power as the sole decision-
17 See Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1362, 1371-1384, 1401-1407 
(1988). 
18 46 U.S.C. § 391(a)(7) (1988); S. REP. No. 724, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2781, 2783. 
19 See Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371~378 (1988); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1531-1543 (1988). 
20 E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e) (1988). 
21 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 27I.L.M. 
1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1987). 
22 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 37 (1972). The President 
has the power to act as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, to receive ambassadors, and, 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties and appoint ambassadors and 
other officers of the United States. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 3. The President also has the 
"executive power," and the responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 
[d. §§ 1, 3. 
Congress's enumerated powers include the power to declare war, to establish, support, and 
regulate the armed forces, to define and punish offenses against the law of nations, and to 
regulate foreign commerce. [d. art. I, § 8. 
23 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
24 [d. at 320. 
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maker in foreign affairs. Instead, it involved a nondelegation 
challenge25 to President Roosevelt's decision to bar arms exports by 
Curtiss-Wright pursuant to authority given him by Congress. 26 
Thus, the "sole organ" language cannot justify claims of executive 
branch authority over foreign affairs absent an express delegation 
of authority by statute. Curtiss-Wright merely sustained the exec-
utive's use of explicitly delegated authority. Commentators have 
criticized Curtiss-Wright's sweeping dicta sharply,27 pointing out 
that the President's authority to act as the federal government's 
"sole organ" in communicating with foreign governments does not 
permit him to formulate and conduct foreign policy by himself. 28 
The Court took a different tack to resolving a separation of powers 
question in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.29 It overturned 
President Truman's order to seize a steel mill to avoid a work stop-
page that might have threatened the United States's war effort in 
Korea.3o Justice Black, writing for the majority, concluded that Pres-
ident Truman's order was an act of presidential lawmaking. 31 The 
seizure was therefore unlawful, because the "President's power, if 
any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or 
from the Constitution itself. "32 The Youngstown majority squarely 
rejected the notion of inherent presidential authority based on a 
provision of the Constitution or act of Congress. 
The current Court formally has endorsed neither the narrow ap-
proach toward presidential power of Justice Black's opinion in 
Youngstown nor the sweeping implications of Justice Sutherland's 
"sole organ" language in Curtiss-Wright. Instead, the Court has 
embraced the analysis embodied in Justice Jackson's concurrence in 
Youngstown,33 and applied it in Dames & Moore v. Regan34 to de-
termine the issue of the President's foreign affairs power in uphold-
ing the Iranian hostage settlement. 
26 [d. at 315. 
26 [d. at 311-13. 
27 See generally Michael J. Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs Power: 
Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 5 (1988); David M. Levitan, The 
Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 
467 (1946); Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An 
Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973). 
28 Glennon, supra note 27, at 15. 
29 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
30 [d. at 583. 
31 [d. at 585, 587-89. 
32 [d. at 585. 
33 343 U.S. at 634-45 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
34 453 U.S. 654, 674 (1981). 
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The Jackson concurrence in Youngstown suggested that presiden-
tial power depends heavily upon congressional will.35 Executive ac-
tions that statutes expressly authorize are presumptively valid. 36 
Initiatives that Congress has not authorized expressly are legitimate 
if within the President's constitutional powers, but subject to further 
inquiry if within an area of concurrent authority.37 Finally, "[ w ]hen 
the President takes measures incompatible with the . . . will of 
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only 
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers 
of Congress over the matter."38 
The Dames & Moore Court endorsed this tripartite framework 
with the caveat that not all executive action fits "neatly" into three 
precise categories.39 The Court placed the President's actions with 
regard to the Iranian hostage crisis in the category of measures 
authorized by Congress, and therefore regarded them as presump-
tively valid. 40 More specifically, the Court held that the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act41 authorized President Carter's 
decision to nullify attachments and liens on Iranian assets in the 
United States in order to facilitate the return of United States 
hostages.42 The Court also upheld the suspension of claims pending 
against Iran in American courts because, according to the Court, 
Congress implicitly had approved this action. 43 As a matter of Court 
doctrine, then, the President's foreign affairs power depends heavily 
upon congressional will, at least in areas that the Constitution has 
not entrusted to him.44 In practice, however, Justice Sutherland's 
suggestion that presidential power is unlimited remains very influ-
ential. 45 
35 Youngstown, 343 u.s. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
36 See id. at 637. 
37 "In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on . . . events ... rather than 
on abstract theories of law." Id. Hence, custom is relevant to this inquiry. 
38 Id. 
39 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981). The Court recognized the analytic 
utility of Justice Jackson's scheme, but agreed with Justice Jackson's comment in Youngstown 
that his scheme may be "somewhat over-simplified." Id. at 669. 
40 Id. at 674, 675-88. 
41 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1988). 
42 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 660, 669-74. 
43 Id. at 686; see also, Harold H. Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign 
Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L. J. 1255, 1310-11 (1988) (criticizing 
the Supreme Court's decision in Dames & Moore). 
44 See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668-69. 
46 See Koh, supra note 43, at 1307-13 (arguing that Curtiss-Wright has greatly influenced 
Court's statutory construction in foreign affairs area). 
1991] INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 295 
The President has used his foreign affairs power to promote in-
ternational environmental goals-indeed, diplomatic activity, rang-
ing from informal dispute resolution to the negotiation of treaties, 
remains the most important means of resolving international envi-
ronmental problems. 46 The Montreal Protocol,47 limiting the world-
wide production of ozone-destroying CFCs, represents just one 
prominent example of the importance of executive negotiations in 
international environmental affairs. 48 The President's custom of ac-
tive participation in international environmental affairs provides an-
other source of law supporting presidential power in this area, de-
spite the lack of specific textual support in the Constitution. 
C. Executive Agreements 
The Constitution expressly authorizes the President to make trea-
ties with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate.49 Pres-
idential agreements with foreign states that the President chooses 
not to submit to the Senate for approval as treaties are called "ex-
ecutive agreements."50 The Supreme Court has determined that 
these agreements are within the President's foreign affairs power, 
notwithstanding the Treaty Clause of the Constitution. 51 The Court 
has held that executive agreements, like treaties, bind the United 
States internationally,52 affect private rights,53 and supersede incon-
sistent state laws. 54 
46 See generally JOHN E. CARROLL, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY: AN EXAMINATION AND 
A PROSPECTIVE OF CANADIAN-U.S. TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL RELATIONS (1983); 
GREGORY WHETSTONE, ACID RAIN IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: NATIONAL RESPONSES 
TO AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM (1983). 
47 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,27 I.L.M. 
1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1987). 
48 The United States and Canada have settled environmental disputes primarily through 
diplomatic rather than legal means. Catherine A. Cooper, The Management of International 
Environmental Disputes in the Context of Canada-U.S. Relations: A Survey and Evaluation 
of Techniques and Mechanisms, 1986 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 247, 253; Robert H. Braver, Note, 
International Conflict Resolution: The ICJ Chambers and the Gulf of Maine Dispute, 23 VA. 
J. INT'L L. 463, 473 (1983). 
49 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c1.2. 
50 Peter J. Lesser, Note, Superseding Statutory Law by Sole Executive Agreement: An 
Analysis of the American Law Institute's Shift in Position, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 671, 672 (1983). 
61 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 
(1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). See generally Myres S. McDougal & 
Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchange-
able Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181 (1945); Lesser, supra note 50. 
62 Pink, 315 U.S. at 203; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331. 
63 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 674, n.6. 
54 Pink, 315 U.S. at 230; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330-31. 
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When the President makes law through diplomatic activity by 
reaching executive agreements, he may create conflicts with various 
federal statutes. 55 Precedent, commentary, and the lack of consti-
tutionally-enumerated presidential powers in the international en-
vironmental area compel the conclusion that federal statutes 
supersede inconsistent sole executive agreements. 56 The Supreme 
Court never has resolved the question of whether sole executive 
agreements-those made pursuant to the President's constitutional 
powers rather than pursuant to a statute-supersede previously 
enacted federal statutes as formal treaties do. 57 The overwhelming 
majority of authority on this question, however, suggests that ex-
ecutive agreements do not trump prior statutes in any area. 58 
65 Sole executive agreements are those that the President makes on the basis of his own 
power. Lesser, supra note 50, at 673. They differ from executive agreements made pursuant 
to a statute. See id. at 682-86. 
56 Id. 
67 The Supreme Court held in Pink and Belmont that sole executive agreements constitute 
valid, self-executing federal laws. Pink, 315 U.S. at 203; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 324. However, 
no statutes addressed the specific issues considered in those two cases. Pink and Belmont do 
not address the precise question of which valid law governs a case when a statute and a sole 
executive agreement conflict. Hence, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations has con-
cluded that the status of executive agreements "relative to earlier Congressional legislation 
has not been authoritatively determined." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW, THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. j (1987). 
Under the "last-in-time" rule, statutes supersede prior executive agreements and treaties. 
See Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 
(1870); Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784 (C.D.C. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799), afl'd on other 
grounds, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 481 (1863). 
68 For example, in Seery v. United States, the United States Court of Claims allowed a 
just compensation claim to go forward in spite of an executive agreement between the United 
States and Austria that settled the plaintiff's claim. 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1955), cert. 
denied, 359 U.S. 943 (1959). The Claims Court said that a sole executive agreement could 
nullify neither the act of Congress consenting to suit nor the plaintiff's constitutional rights. 
Id. at 607. 
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado has held that the President 
may not supersede the Internal Revenue Code by executive agreement. Swearingen v. United 
States, 565 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Colo. 1983). In O'Connor v. United States, the Supreme Court 
interpreted the executive agreement in a manner that would not conflict with the Internal 
Revenue Code that the Colorado district court had indicated would control. 479 U.S. 27 (1986). 
See also W. MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT 344 (1941) ("Congress 
apparently possesses the final power in case of conflict between a legislative and an executive 
act."); Edwin Borachard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53 YALE L.J. 
664, 671 (1944); Arthur H. Dean, Amending the Treaty Power, 6 STAN. L. REV. 589, 607 
(1954) ("Unlike a treaty ... an executive agreement is inoperative as law in the United States 
to the extent that it conflicts with a prior act of Congress in an area of congressional compe-
tence"); Francis B. Sayre, The Constitutionality of the Trade Agreements Act, 39 COLUM. L. 
REV. 751, 755 (1939); McDougal & Lans, supra note 50, at 317 ("A direct Presidential 
agreement will not ordinarily be valid if contrary to previously enacted legislation"). But see 
Jack M. Goldklang, The President, The Congress, and Executive Agreements, 24 VA. J. INT'L 
L. 755 (1983); Craig Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude Inter-
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In the environmental area, the case for the supremacy of a statute 
over a subsequently enacted executive agreement is overwhelming. 
As noted above, federal statutes regarding the international envi-
ronment involve Congress's international commerce power. 59 Article 
I of the Constitution vests that power in Congress. 60 Moreover, 
Congress has the power to define and punish offenses against the 
law of nations. 61 This enumerated power provides a constitutional 
basis for legislation implementing fisheries agreements and address-
ing international environmental problems. 62 
By contrast, no constitutionally enumerated power of the Presi-
dent would support an executive agreement that violated or con-
flicted with a federal statute regulating international commerce or 
punishing a violation of the law of nations. 63 If the President has any 
constitutional authority in this area, it must be an unenumerated 
power to act as "sole organ" of the nation in foreign affairs. As 
mentioned above, however, the Supreme Court has endorsed the 
theory of the Jackson concurrence in Youngstown, which suggests 
that presidential power depends in some measure upon congressional 
will, especially in areas where the Constitution explicitly bestows 
power upon Congress. Moreover, the case law on conflicts between 
executive agreements and federal statutes in the area of interna-
tional commerce supports the conclusion that more general cases on 
the separation of powers have suggested. 
For example, a 1953 decision by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit, United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc. ,64 
affirmed the supremacy of federal statutes by invalidating a contract 
national Agreements, 64 YALE L.J. 345, 381 (1955) (suggesting that the President should be 
able to supersede legislation during national crisis); HENKIN, supra note 22, at 186 ("If one 
grants the President some legislative authority in foreign affairs--as in regard to sovereign 
immunity-one might grant it to him in this respect too"). 
Dictum in Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Ozanic v. United States supports the notion 
that executive agreements can supersede statutes. 188 F.2d 228 (2nd Cir. 1951). In denying 
a Yugoslavian claim settled by an executive agreement pursuant to the Lend-Lease Act of 
1941, Judge Hand noted that the executive's constitutional power to settle claims with a 
foreign government repeals congressional consent to be sued. Id. at 231. 
59 See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 241 (1986) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text. 
60 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
61 Id. cl. 10. 
62 HENKIN, supra note 22, at 322 n.24. 
63 The President's enumerated powers include power as commander-in-chief, the power to 
make treaties (with the Senate's consent), the power to appoint ambassadors, and the power 
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. See U.S. CONST. Art. II, §§ 2, 3. Laws 
referred to in the "take care" clause probably do not refer to international law. HENKIN, supra 
note 22, at 55-56. 
64 346 U.S. 884 (1953). 
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made pursuant to an executive agreement.65 The court voided the 
executive agreement because Congress had not authorized it, and 
because it "contravened provisions of a statute dealing with the very 
matter to which it related."66 
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Japan Whaling Ass'n v. 
American Cetacean Society67 indirectly supports this view. The case 
seemed to involve a conflict between a federal statute that required 
the Secretary of Commerce to impose sanctions upon countries 
whose citizens violated internationally-established whaling quotas68 
and an executive agreement that promised to forego sanctions 
against a violator in exchange for the violator's promise of future 
compliance. 69 The Court did not consider explicitly the possibility 
that the executive agreement might supersede an earlier statute. It 
purported to treat the case as a pure question of statutory interpre-
tation. 70 The failure of any justice to mention any constitutional issue 
suggests that the Court regards the proposition that a federal statute 
supersedes an executive agreement in the area of international en-
vironmental affairs as settled law. 
Whether or not executive agreements supersede statutes as a 
general matter, they do not supersede statutes regulating foreign 
commerce and not touching upon enumerated presidential powers. 
Thus, Congress, not the President, has a strong case for plenary 
power to regulate the international environment. This implies that 
statutory construction biased in favor of the President may undercut 
constitutional principle. 
III. THE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
Congress has not only a strong constitutional claim to a role in 
international environmental affairs, but also a strong tradition of 
concern and involvement.71 It recognized that environmental prob-
66 [d. 
66 204 F.2d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 1953), a/I'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955). 
67 478 U.S. 221 (1986). 
68 [d. at 223-29; see Packwood Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation Act, 16 
U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(B) (1988) (requiring 50% reduction in offending nation's fishing allocation 
in United States water). 
69 Japan Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 227-28. 
70 [d. at 230. 
71 Executive branch diplomacy, however, remains an extremely important means of ad-
dressing international environmental problems. See generally CARROLL, supra note 46; WHET-
STONE, supra note 46. 
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lems exist world-wide and explicitly supported international coop-
eration in solving these problems in one of the earliest modern 
environmental statutes, the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) of 1969. 72 
A. The International Role of Domestic Environmental Statutes 
The United States's domestic environmental statutes contribute 
to the generation of an international political climate more receptive 
to environmental responsibility. For example, over thirty countries 
have passed legislation resembling NEPA, which requires federal 
agencies to evaluate the environmental consequences of proposed 
major federal actions before going forward with their plans. 73 These 
domestic environmental statutes implement and, as evidence of state 
practice, create customary international law. 74 Under international 
law, states have an obligation to ensure that their activities do not 
cause significant injury to the environment of other states or areas 
beyond their boundaries. 75 As a corollary, states often have a duty 
to notify and consult with neighboring states about environmental 
problems. 76 • 
72 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 102(2)(E), 83 
Stat. 852, 853 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(f) (1988». 
73 MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION, (1991 Supp.) at 167. 
74 See infra note 81 and accompanying text. Domestic statutes can create customary 
international law to the extent that they provide evidence of state practice. See generally G. 
1. Tunkin, Remarks on the Juridicial Nature of Customary Norms of International Law, 49 
CAL. L. REV. 419, 429 (1961). Determining which state practices count as customary inter-
national law poses a difficult theoretical problem that is beyond the scope of this Article. See 
generally Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, The Prescribing Function in the World 
Constitutive Process: How International Law is Made, 6 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 249 
(1980). See also Note, supra note 3, at 1504 (only state practice carried out with conviction 
that international law requires that practice constitutes source of customary international 
law). 
'IS Restatement (Third) of the Law, The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 601 
provides: 
(1) A state is obligated to take such measures as may be necessary, to the extent 
practicable under the circumstance", to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction 
or control 
(a) conform to generally accepted international rules and standards for the preven-
tion, reduction, and control of injury to the environment of another state or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; and 
(b) are conducted so as not to cause significant injury to the environment of another 
state or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW, THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 601 (1987). Moreover, a state is responsible to other states for violations of these obligations 
under § 601(1). See id. § 601(2). 
76 Id. § 601 n.7. 
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In the area of transboundary pollution, for example, the United 
States traditionally has fulfilled this obligation through a long-stand-
ing practice of executive consultation with Canada. 77 Congress has 
institutionalized this practice in the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA). Thus, the Clean Air Act provides for foreign partic-
ipation in hearings preceding the revision of state implementation 
plans;78 the Clean Water Act requires the EPA to invite foreign 
countries to hearings under certain circumstances;79 and the Envi-
ronmental Pesticides Control Act requires the EPA to notify foreign 
governments and international agencies when the agency cancels a 
pesticide's registration. 8O Congress also creates international law by 
ratifying and implementing formal international agreements that the 
President has concluded. 81 
B. Statutes Directly Regulating Foreign Relations 
While many of the United States's domestic statutes have an 
international environmental dimension, most do not attempt to con-
trol the conduct of other nations. Congress has found, however, that 
it is powerless to protect the United States's environment without 
trying to regulate other countries' citizens as well. As a result, 
Congress has passed laws discouraging funding of environmentally 
destructive development projects abroad, regulating foreign nation-
als' conduct within the United States's territorial sea, guiding dip-
lomatic negotiations with foreign nations, and directly punishing 
other countries conduct outside the United States through sanctions. 
1. Legislation Relating to Negotiation 
Congress has refrained from regulating the negotiation of inter-
national agreements through detailed legislation. Generally, legis-
77 Id. (citing 1980 memorandum of intent regarding transboundary air pollution (United 
States Dep't of State, Press Release No. 209A, Aug. 6, 1980)). 
78 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (1988). A finding that air pollution from the United States is endangering 
the public health or welfare of a foreign country triggers a revision of a state implementation 
plan under the Clean Air Act. Id.; see also Her Majesty the Queen in RT of Ontario v. EPA, 
912 F.2d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that EPA had not issued findings triggering revision). 
79 33 U.S.C. § 1320(a) (1988). 
80 7 U.S.C. § 136o(b) (1988). United States companies may export pesticides not approved 
for use in this country if they notify the foreign government that the pesticide has not been 
registered in the United States. Id. § 136o(a). The law also requires the EPA to cooperate in 
international efforts to improve pesticide research and regulation. Id. § 1360(d). If the chemical 
exporter is a corporation, the Toxic Substances Control Act similarly requires the EPA to 
advise foreign countries of chemical test data and actions taken under EPA evaluation. 15 
U.S.C. § 2611(b) (1988). 
81 E.g., Governing International Fishery Agreement with Japan, Pub. L. No. 100-220, 101 
Stat. 1459 (1987) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1823 (1988)). 
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lation addressing international environmental diplomacy and nego-
tiation deliberately leaves the President substantial discretion. For 
example, the Global Climate Protection Act of 198782 aims to spur 
international action on the issue of global warming and influence 
policy priorities; however, it avoids restraining the President signif-
icantly. The Act declares general goals for United States policy,83 
including working toward multilateral agreements;84 calls for the 
formulation of a national policy on global warming;85 requires a report 
from the President on climate change;86 and urges, rather than di-
rects, the President to give climate protection a high priority on the 
agenda of United States-Soviet relations. 87 Congress has directed 
the President to seek agreements on specific topics. Both the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act88 and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act89 
encourage the President to seek international agreements promoting 
the statutes' goals. 90 Neither, however, addresses particulars. 
The President must be careful only to negotiate agreements that 
Congress will support if he wishes to avoid the embarrassment of 
congressional refusal to bind the nation to presidentially negotiated 
environmental agreements. Nevertheless, the dynamics of the ne-
gotiation process suggest that the congressional reluctance to reg-
ulate diplomacy strictly is wise policy. Congress cannot foresee, at 
the time it passes legislation, how other countries will react to 
various proposals and events. The President must be free to adjust 
to the changing international arena in order to negotiate successfully. 
Thus, environmental legislation usually directs that the President 
seek to achieve a general goal through negotiation and leaves the 
timing and precise content of proposals to presidential discretion. 
2. Unilateral Action 
While Congress generally has not regulated diplomacy, it has 
restricted foreign aid in pursuit of environmental goals and unilat-
82 Pub. Law No. 100-204, §§ 1101-1106, 101 Stat. 1407 (1987). 
83 Id. § 1103(a). 
84 Id. § 1103(a)(4). 
85 Id. § 1103(b). 
86 Id. § 1104. Congress required the Secretary of State and EPA Administrator to sum-
marize current scientific understandings of global climate change, assess the United States's 
efforts to address this problem, and describe a strategy for enhancing international coopera-
tion. Id. 
87 Id. § 1106. 
88 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988). 
89 Pub. L. No. 95-474, 92 Stat. 1471 (1978) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1221 (1988) and 46 
U.S.C. §§ 214, 391a (1988)). 
90 16 U.S.C. § 1378 (1988); 3 U.S.C. § 1230 (1988). 
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erally applied sanctions to foreign citizens to promote international 
environmental standards. Neither of these actions requires negoti-
ation. 
a. Foreign Aid 
United States foreign aid to Brazil and other South American 
countries has funded projects that required cutting down trees in 
the Amazon jungle. Growing awareness that deforestation helps 
cause global warming91 has prompted Congress to restrict foreign 
aid used for these purposes. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1986 
directs the President to deny assistance for colonization of forest 
lands, dam construction and road building projects in forests, and 
the conversion of forest land to cattle ranches.92 The Act contains 
exceptions for activities that directly improve the livelihood of the 
rural poor and support sustainable development if these activities 
are conducted in an "environmentally sound manner."93 
The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Appro-
priations Act of 1991 (1991 Act) further restricts foreign aid while 
promoting environmental initiatives by the multilateral development 
banks. 94 These banks are international institutions that pool funds ' 
from all over the world in order to make loans to promote economic 
development, especially in poorer countries.95 They include the In-
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-
national Development Association, and the International Finance 
Corporation. 96 Bank-funded mining, dam construction, and road 
building projects have hastened the destruction of tropical rainfor-
ests and other natural resources. 97 
91 See 22 U.S.C. § 2151p-1(a) (1988) ("Congress is particularly concerned about the con-
tinuing and accelerating alteration, destruction, and loss of tropical forests in developing 
countries, which pose a serious threat to ... the environment. Tropical forest destruction 
and loss ... can result in desertification and destabilization of the earth's climate."). 
92 22 U.S.C. § 2151p-1(c)(15) (198,8). 
93 Id. The statute describes the forest lands to which it applies somewhat ambiguously. 
The prohibition of aid to cattle ranching and colonization applies simply to "forest lands." Id. 
The ban on aid to road construction and dams applies only to "relatively undegraded forest 
lands." Id. § 2151p-1(c)(15)(B). 
94 Pub. L. No. 101-513, § 533, 104 Stat. 2013 (1990) (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. § 2621 (West 
Supp. 1991)). 
95 BEREND A. DEVRIES, REMAKING THE WORLD BANK 8-16 (1987). 
96 See id. The World Bank includes the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment and the International Development Association. The International Finance Corpora-
tion is an affiliate of the World Bank. Id. at 8. 
97 Bruce Rich, Funding Deforestation: Conservation Woes at the World Bank, NATION, 
Jan. 23, 1989,88,88-93; see Mcgee and Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 527,544-47. 
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In recent years, environmental groups and others have pressured 
the banks to promote "sustainable economic development," meaning 
economic development strategies that do not destroy the world's 
resource base. The 1991 Act supports these efforts. It forbids the 
use of United States funds for timber extraction and other projects 
causing significant loss of tropical rainforests. 98 It also directs the 
United States executive director of each multilateral development 
bank to promote "sustainable" management of natural resources. 99 
More specifically, it requires these directors to expand bank pro-
grams in energy conservation;IOO improve cost-benefit analysis of 
projects increasing "power-generating capacity;"101 conduct environ-
mental assessments of proposed energy projects early in the project 
cycle, with public participation and consideration of alternatives to 
the proposed projects;102 include environmental costs in economic 
assessments;103 and provide technical assistance. 104 
b. Sanctions 
Congress has used unilateral sanctions to prod other nations into 
adopting multilateral agreements on oil pollution, induce their com-
pliance with established international standards, and impose upon 
them the United States's environmental norms. These efforts have 
produced some noteworthy successes. 
The attempts to discourage oil spills from ships provide an excel-
lent example of Congress and the President using a statute as a tool 
to force progress in international negotiations. lo5 Unilateral action 
by the United States pursuant to statutes designed to force inter-
national agreement led directly to the 1978 International Conference 
on Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention. I06 The United States 
later adopted the international convention formulated at the confer-
ence.107 
98 22 U.S.C.A. § 2621(c)(3) (West Supp. 1991). 
99 [d. § 2621(a). 
100 [d. § 2621(a)(1). 
101 [d. § 2621(2). 
102 [d. § 2621(3). 
103 [d. § 2621(4). 
104 [d. § 2621(5). 
105 See generally D. ABECASSIS AND R. JARASHOE, OIL POLLUTION FROM SHIPS (2d ed. 
1985) (examining international, British, and United States laws on marine pollution); J. KINDT, 
2 MARINE POLLUTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 1153-1213 (1986) (emphasizing international 
aspects but including major United States legislation in the area). 
106 ABECASSIS, supra note 105, at 441. 
107 [d. 
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Congress enacted The Ports and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA) 
in 1972 to require that the United States Coast Guard promulgate 
rules and regulations to protect the environment. 108 PWSA section 
201(7) mandated that the United States unilaterally impose tanker 
design and construction standards upon foreign vessels by 1976, 
unless relevant standards were adopted sooner by international 
agreement.109 The congressional committee recommending the leg-
islation preferred international standards. 110 President Carter fol-
lowed up on the congressional initiative by directing the Secretary 
of Transportation to prepare new regulations on tanker construction 
and equipment, ordering the Coast Guard to board tankers for in-
spection, and encouraging the Department of State to seek an inter-
national agreement. 111 
The 1978 International Conference on Tanker Safety and Pollution 
Prevention was convened in London specifically to discourage the 
unilateral action that the United States promised. 112 The conference 
amended the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).113 MARPOL, as amended, has the 
most wide-ranging and strict provisions relating to oil pollution of 
any international agreement ever adopted. 114 
While this strategy did not involve Congress's enacting a rigid 
legal rule to govern the precise content of the negotiations, it did 
involve a threat to impose standards unilaterally. The success of the 
strategy probably depended in part upon other nations' belief that 
the United States would carry out its threat. Rigid law strictly 
interpreted conveys threats effectively. 
\08 Pub. L. No. 92-340, 86 Stat. 424 (1972). 
\09 46 U.S.C. §§ 3704--3709 (1988). 
llO S. REP. No. 724, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2781, 
2783. 
1lI ABECASSIS, supra note 105, at 451. 
ll2 [d. at 453. Nevertheless, Congress amended the 1972 legislation to impose standards 
on foreign and domestic ships in United States waters. See Port and Tanker Safety Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-474, 92 Stat. 1471 (1978) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1222, 1224, 1228, 1232 
(1988) and 46 U.S.C. §§ 214, 391a (1988)). Although the 1978 amendments represented Con-
gress's independent judgment about what standards should govern vessels in United States 
waters, Congress adopted the international standards to the extent feasible. In fact, the 1978 
amendments went further than the Conference on Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention in 
certain respects. ABECASSIS, supra note 105, at 454. 
ll3 ABECASSIS, supra note 105, at 36--37. 
114 [d. at 37. The United States signed MARPOL 73178 on June 27, 1978. The Senate 
ratified the convention on July 2, 1980, and Congress implemented the convention with the 
passage of the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships on October 21, 1980. [d. The convention 
entered into force in the United States on October 2, 1983. [d. at 454. Because the convention 
is so ambitious, only 33 parties had adopted it as of December 3i, 1984. These parties, however, 
represent 70% of the world's tonnage. [d. at 20. 
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Congress's attempts to preserve dolphins provide a good example 
of conservation through the use of economic sanctions against coun-
tries that have not adopted United States conservation practices. 115 
The United States has had sO.me success in discouraging the inci-
dental drowning of dolphins in tuna fishers' nets. 116 The country 
controls the yellowfin tuna market, and a provision of the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act (MMP A) restricts imports of tuna caught 
without adherence to United States conservation guidelines. 117 As a 
result, several countries including the Congo, New Zealand, Sene-
gal, and Spain have directed their fleets to follow United States 
procedures for releasing dolphins. 118 Moreover, MMP A established 
a permit system to limit the number of marine mammals either the 
United States fleet or a foreign fleet may capture within the United 
States fishery conservation zone. 119 
The Packwood Amendments to the 1976 Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act120 provided automatic sanctions for acts diminish-
ing the effectiveness of international fishery programs. 121 Presidents 
have secured promises of future compliance with fishery agreements 
by threatening to use these sanctions. 122 The Act has been less than 
totally successful, however, in discouraging whale harvesting by 
Japan and the Soviet Union. One critic has attributed this lack of 
success in part to the executive branch's failure to use the sanctions 
the Act provides. 123 
115 International sanctions alone do not account for this progress. The United States for a 
time invested in research for fishing gear designed to catch tuna without catching porpoises. 
KINDT, supra note 105, at 1337. Moreover, the United States regulates its own fleet very 
carefully to avoid taking porpoises. See Balelo v. Baldridge, 724 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(upholding regulation requiring vessel owners to consent to placement of observers on their 
boats who could collect data for use in civil or criminal penalty proceedings). 
ll6 See Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407. Dall's porpoise mortality 
has declined from 20,000 porpoises per year in the late 1970s, to around 6000 in 1982. MARINE 
MAMMAL COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, CALENDAR 
YEAR 1982: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 45 (1982). 
ll7 Laurel L. Hyde, Comment, Dolphin Conservation In the Tuna Industry: The United 
States Role in an International Problem, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 665, 691 (1979). 
llB I d. at 692. 
ll9 MMP A establishes a moratorium on the "take" of all marine mammals within 200 miles 
of the United States coast. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1362, 1371-1372 (1988). The statute, however, allows 
the Secretary of Commerce to issue marine mammal take permits under some circumstances. 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1371-1375, 1381 (1988). MMPA applies to foreign as well as domestic fishing 
fleets. See Federation of Japan Salmqn Fisheries Cooperative Ass'n v. Baldridge, 679 F. Supp. 
37 (D.D.C. 1987) (preliminary enjoining Secretary of Commerce from issuing take permit to 
Japanese Salmon Fishery). 
120 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (1988). 
121 Id.; 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(l) (1988). 
122 Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 225 (1986). 
123 Don Bonker, U.S. Policy and Strategy in the International Whaling Commission: 
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While statutes playa relatively minor role in negotiation between 
the United States and other countries, they have controlled unilat-
eral action in the area of international environmental affairs. Multi-
lateral actions may be preferable to unilateral actions designed to 
prevent international environmental injury, but unilateral action of-
fers advantages that one cannot ignore. 124 Unilateral action is easier 
than multilateral action and can encourage desirable state practices, 
protect the environment, and even promote multilateral agree-
ments. 125 
A statute mandating sanctions provides a special advantage in the 
environmental context-it forces countries to internalize the costs 
of their environmentally destructive practices. The problem of "ex-
ternalities" is central to environmental law. 126 A country dumping 
waste into the ocean, harvesting the last of an endangered species, 
or cutting down rainforests realizes most of the economic benefits of 
its activity, but others help bear the environmental costs. 127 Because 
the country is able to externalize these costs, it may carryon activ-
ities even when the cost of the environmental destruction far exceeds 
the value of the economic gain. l28 By making a country pay these 
costs itself, unilateral action may change what a country rationally 
pursuing its self-interest will do. In theory, at least, a country will 
not conduct economic activity when costs exceed revenues. Costs 
will exceed revenues more often for environmentally destructive 
Sinking or Swimming?, 10 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 41, 52-53 (1981); see also Japan Whaling 
Ass'n, 478 U.S. 221 (1986). 
124 See Richard B. Bilder, The Role of Unilateral State Action in Preventing International 
Environmental Injury, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51, 79-83 (1981). See generally, LAW 
INSTITUTIONS, AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT (John L. Hargrove ed., 1972); Samuel A. 
Belcher, An Overview of International Environmental RegUlation, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 75-90 
(1972); Coan, et. al., Strategies for International Environmental Action: The Case for and 
Environmentally Oriented Foreign Policy, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 87 (1974); Marshall I. 
Goldman, Pollution: International Complications, 2 ENVTL. AFF. 1, 12-14 (1972); Allan 
Gotlieb & Charles Dalefen, National Jurisdiction and International Responsibility: New 
Canadian Approaches to International Law, 67 AM J. INT'L L. 299 (1973); Jon L. Jacobson, 
Bridging the Gap to International Fisheries Agreement: A Guide for Unilateral Action, 9 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 454 (1972). 
125 Bilder, supra note 124. 
126 See ANDERSON ET. AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCEN-
TIVES 3-4 (1977). See generally ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW & POLICY 15-50 (An-
derson et. al. eds., 1990). 
127 See generally Kenton Miller, et. al., Deforestation & Species Loss: Responding to the 
Crises in PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: THE CHALLENGE OF SHARED LEADER-
SHIP 78,93 (Jessica Mathews ed., 1991). 
128 See generally ANDERSON, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT, supra note 126; Garrett 
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243 (1968). 
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activity if the state carrying out the activity must pay some cost 
associated with the environmental harm. 
Unilateral action sometimes can bring about results more quickly 
than multilateral action. 129 This can be important when multilateral 
agreements have proved impossible and the environmental problem 
needing resolution involves irreversible consequences. For instance, 
the process of negotiation may be too slow to save an endangered 
species. Legislation providing for unilateral action also promotes 
policy stability over a longer period of time than a President's term 
in office. Consistent, stable policy may help solve stubborn long-term 
environmental problems. Of course, legislation may prove overly 
rigid-it is not a panacea. 
When generally accepted principles of international law support 
sanctions, compliance will be more likely than when they do not. 
For instance, the United States's threats to regulate tankers visiting 
its ports and its laws regulating the taking of marine mammals in 
its territorial waters have proved fairly successful because no one 
doubts the legitimacy of the United States's regulation of activities 
within its territorial seas. Unilateral imposition of sanctions upon 
foreign countries for their actions taken outside of United States 
territorial waters poses special difficulties. 130 Courts must appreciate 
these difficulties in order to interpret statutes imposing them 
properly. Obviously, no country will restrict its activities in response 
to a statute unless the sanctions imposed seem substantial and the 
norm that the statute enforces appears legitimate. Consistent appli-
cation will make the threat of the sanction more credible and enhance 
the legitimacy of the norm it is trying to enforce. 
Environmental standards have a certain credibility which unilat-
erally imposed trade or military policies lack. A statutory provision, 
like the Packwood Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Conser-
vation and Management Act,131 which provides sanctions for taking 
endangered whales, seems on its face to be aimed at a world-wide 
problem. By contrast, a unilaterally imposed restriction on another 
nation's military activity would appear to be nothing but a naked 
assertion of self-interest. This is not to say that statutes threatening 
unilaterally imposed sanctions should dominate international envi-
ronmental policy. Multilateral and bilateral processes are probably 
more effective at disseminating information that might persuade 
129 Bilder, supra note 124, at 79-80. 
130 I d. at 68. 
131 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (1988). 
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countries to give up their own financially advantageous activities for 
the sake of minimizing global environmental damage. 132 It is not 
possible to characterize unilateral action as inherently either desir-
able or undesirable. 133 A comprehensive and effective system of 
international environmental control will require a mix of multilateral 
agreements and unilateral legislation.134 Understanding the impor-
tance of unilateral international action, however, should enhance the 
interpretation of statutes that might impinge upon the presidential 
foreign affairs power. This understanding should encourage respect 
for Congress's role and consistent application of its laws. 
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A. Current Doctrine and Practice 
In the international environmental area, administrative agencies 
exercise the powers that statutes delegate to the executive branch. 135 
Judicial review of agency action under these statutes commonly 
focuses upon the question of whether the agency has complied with 
the statute it administers. 136 The court must determine congressional 
intent from the statute's text and legislative history.137 If either the 
text or the legislative history speaks clearly to the issue before the 
court, the court must follow the intent of Congress as expressed in 
the statute or legislative history.l38 Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council,139 federal courts must defer to 
an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute if the statute's 
text is ambiguous and the legislative history does not speak to the 
132 See generally Bilder, supra note 124, at 90. Congress has also spurred multilateral 
information exchange. See Driftnet Impact Monitoring, Assessment and Control Act, Pub. L. 
No. 100-220, Title IV, § 1404, 101 Stat. 1477, (1987) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1822 (1988)) 
(requiring international negotiations aimed at assessing impact of driftnetting on marine 
mammals). 
133 Bilder, supra note 124, at 95. 
134 I d. at 95. 
136 See supra note 5. 
136 See infra note 149 and accompanying text. 
137 Immigration and Naturalization Servo v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 427-49 (1987) 
(applying legislative history and statutory language to overrule administrative interpretation 
of asylum requirements); Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759, 
2770 (1990) (rejecting Interstate Commerce Commission's negotiated rate policy as inconsis-
tent with Interstate Commerce Act). See generally Zeppos, supra note 8. 
138 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-
843 (1984) ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter ... "). 
139 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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issues before the court. 140 Chevron and its successors hold that courts 
should not defer to an agency's interpretation of its statute if clear 
legislative intent emerges from an examination of a statutory text 
and its legislative history. 141 
In practice, however, the Supreme Court often ignores legislative 
history and even plain statutory language in order to uphold the 
President's actions in foreign affairs against challenges to statutes 
delegating power to the executive. 142 The Court brought this tradi-
tion of extraordinary statutory interpretation to Weinberger v. Cath-
olic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project,143 a case in which 
the government successfully argued that a NEP A claim implicated 
national security.l44 Weinberger stemmed from a citizen group's at-
tempt to force the United States Navy to prepare an environmental 
impact statement (EIS) regarding the effect of storing nuclear weap-
ons at a facility in Hawaii. 145 The Navy claimed that the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) precluded its writing an EIS because infor-
mation about whether it stored nuclear weapons at the facility was 
classified. 146 In ruling for the Navy, the Court ignored the language 
of the FOIA amendments that required it to determine de novo 
whether the Navy properly had classified the information. 147 
Similarly, the Court showed extraordinary deference to the ex-
ecutive branch in Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Cetacean Society.148 In 
that case, wildlife conservation groups challenged the executive 
branch's response to the Japanese harvesting of Northern Pacific 
sperm whales. The International Whaling Commission, an interna-
tional body established to regulate whale harvests under the Inter-
140 Id. at 843-44. 
141 Id. at 84~3. The Court explained, "[iJf the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end 
of the matter ... ". Id. The post Chevron Court has repudiated agency interpretations 
inconsistent with a statute's text and legislative history. See Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. 
Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S.Ct. 2759, 2770 (1990); Immigration and Naturalization Servo V. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
142 See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (arguably ignoring plain statutory language 
to uphold travel restrictions to Cuba); Dames & Moore V. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 671-74 
(interpreting International Emergency Economic Power Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982), 
in order to uphold President Carter's hostage agreement). See generally Koh, supra note 43, 
at 1309-10. 
148 454 U.S. 139 (1981). 
144 Id. at 143-47. 
145 Id. at 141-42. 
146 Id. 
147 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988); Morton H. Halperin, The National Security State: 
Never Question the President, in THE BURGER YEARS: RIGHTS AND WRONGS IN THE SU-
PREME COURT 1969-1986, at 50,54 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987). 
148 478 U.S. 221 (1986). 
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national Convention on the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW),149 had 
established a zero quota for the harvest of Pacific sperm whales in 
1981. 150 Japan had continued to harvest whales notwithstanding the 
zero quota. 151 The statute before the Court required the Secretary 
of Commerce to impose sanctions upon countries whose fishing "di-
minishes the effectiveness" of the ICRW.152 These sanctions included 
a reduction, by at least fifty percent, of the offending nation's fishery 
allocation within the United States's fishery conservation zone. l53 
Instead of sanctioning Japan for its failure to accept the zero quota, 
the Secretary of Commerce concluded an executive agreement with 
Japan that appeared to promise compliance by 1988.154 The Supreme 
Court ignored clear legislative history showing that Congress in-
tended the mandatory imposition of sanctions for violations of inter-
national whaling quotas, and upheld the Secretary's decision. 155 Al-
though the Court claimed to be following the Chevron rule in Japan 
Whaling Ass'n, all commentators have agreed that neither legisla-
tive history nor the words of the statute justified the extraordinary 
deference to the executive branch in this case. 156 
149 Dec. 2, 1946,62 Stat. 17l6, 161 U.N.T.S 72 (entered into force Nov. 10, 1948). 
150 Japan Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 227. 
161 Id. at 227. Japan served a timely notice that it would not comply with the quota, which 
it had the right to do under the convention. Id. at 224, 227. 
162 Id. at 225-26 (citing 22 U.S.C. §§ 1978(a)(l), 1978(a)(4) (1988); 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1821(e)(2)(A)(i), 1821(2)(A)(i) (1988). 
163 Japan's Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 225-26. 
164 Compare Japan Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 227 (majority opinion) with Japan Whaling 
Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 246 (Marshall J., dissenting). 
165 The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit's opinion concluded that the 
legislative history indicates "quite plainly that fishing in excess of internationally set quotas 
was considered an automatic trigger of certification." American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge, 
768 F.2d 426, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (emphasis added), rev'd sub nom. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. 
American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986). See S. REP. No. 582, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 
(197l); Hearing on Whaling Policy and International Whaling Commission Oversight Before 
the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House 
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 301, 322-23 (1979) 
[hereinafter Whaling Policy Hearing]; H.R. REP. No. 468, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 8-10 (197l); 
Hearings on S. 1242 et al. Before the Subcommittee on Oceans and Atmosphere of the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (197l). 
166 See Ronald J. Haskell, Abandoning Whale Conservation Initiatives in Japan Whaling 
Association v. American Cetacean Society, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 551 (1987) (arguing 
that Congress intended to mandate sanctions under circumstances of case, and the Supreme 
Court should have used doctrine that equitable remedies were discretionary to refuse to order 
Secretary to impose them); Melinda K. Blatt, Case Note, Woe for the Whales, 55 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1285, 1296 (1987); Virginia A. Curry, Note, Japan Whaling Association v. American 
Cetacean Society: The Great Whales Become Casualties of the Trade Wars, 4 PACE ENVTL. 
L. REV. 277, 278 (1986) (arguing that Court decided to allow Secretary of Commerce to favor 
international trade over conservation); see also Christopher S. Gibson, Narrow Grounds for 
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The Japan Whaling Ass'n decision reversed a two-to-one decision 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit. 157 The majority on the Court of Appeals had upheld a district 
court decision ordering the Secretary of Commerce to impose sanc-
tions. l58 Judge Oberdorfer's dissent argued for the result that the 
Supreme Court majority ultimately reached: a decision allowing the 
Secretary of Commerce to avoid imposing sanctions. 
Judge Oberdorfer had argued that a different standard of review 
applies in cases affecting foreign affairs. 159 In particular, according 
to Judge Oberdorfer, because the Secretary of Commerce had relied 
upon his reading of the Pelly and Packwood Amendments to form 
an international agreement, the court should not overrule the Sec-
retary unless his interpretation was clearly erroneous. 160 The judge 
further suggested that a court should interpret an ambiguous statute 
addressing foreign relations in favor of the executive branch rather 
than in accordance with its legislative history.161 In effect, he called 
for a plain statement rule whereby a court only would read a statute 
to constrain the President in foreign affairs if the actual language of 
the statute admitted of no other interpretation. 
Although the Supreme Court did not formally adopt the doctrine 
that Judge Oberdorfer advocated, it did what he suggested in Japan 
Whaling Ass'n. Judge Oberdorfer's dissent articulately justified the 
different standard of review often used in foreign affairs cases in 
practice without explicit justification. It represents an influential 
alternative to the Chevron approach for international environmental 
affairs cases limiting the President's foreign affairs power. 
B. The Proper Role for the Court 
N either the Constitution, history, nor sound policy justifies the 
deferential approach that Judge Oberdorfer advocated and that the 
Supreme Court has used in practice. This Article already has indi-
cated that the claim that the President possesses some sort of con-
stitutional prerogative to do as he pleases in this particular area of 
a Complex Decision: The Supreme Court's Review of an Agency's Statutory Construction in 
Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 485, 513-16 
(1987). 
157 Japan Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 229, overruling American Cetacean Soc'y v. Bald-
ridge, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
158 Japan Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 228-29. 
159 American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge, 768 F.2d at 445-49 (Oberdorfer, J., dissenting). 
160 [d. at 447-48. 
161 [d. at 449. 
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foreign affairs is untenable. Rather, statutes delegating congres-
sional power to the President may limit the President's authority. 
A proper understanding and respect for Congress's historical role 
in international environmental protection should inform courts ap-
proach to this area, not a flawed assumption that the President has 
plenary authority. The courts should enhance the efficacy of unilat-
erallegislation and promote dialogue and compromise between Con-
gress and the executive branch on issues of power and policy. 162 
1. Enhancing the Efficacy of Unilateral Legislation 
The legitimacy of an environmental standard depends in part upon 
its consistent application. A lack of uniform, predictable enforcement 
of international environmental statutes increases the likelihood that 
the country upon which sanctions are imposed will interpret the 
enforcement effort not as an even-handed application of principled 
environmental law, but as an affront to the country. 
Special deference to the executive branch will allow the law to 
fluctuate with the politics of each administration and thereby lose 
its legitimacy. Extreme doctrines of deference make it impossible 
for groups to insist on consistent application of statutorily estab-
lished enforcement practices. Absent that constraint, the pressures 
on an administration to vary its use of sanctions according to the 
status of its relations with the violator and its whole array of policy 
goals will be overwhelming. 
162 Jesse Choper has argued that political rather than judicial processes should settle 
separation of powers conflicts whenever possible. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW 
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE 
OF THE SUPREME COURT 260-379 (1980). Choper assumes that courts must refrain from 
issuing orders to the executive branch in order to make sure that political processes resolve 
separation of powers conflicts. Id. Congress and the executive branch, however, engage in a 
political process when Congress passes a statute delegating power to the President. See infra 
notes 167-69 and accompanying text. Congress consults with the executive branch about the 
appropriate amount of discretion the President should have. See CHOPER, supra, at 260-379. 
If courts fail to issue orders implementing the statutes that Congress passes and the President 
signs, they subvert the political compromises that these statutes embody. They allow one 
branch of government, the executive, to redefine the political relationship unilaterally. This 
subverts the political processes that the Constitution envisions. 
Choper apparently recognizes that his argument against the justiciability of separation of 
powers claims cannot apply to cases requiring that a President follow a statute. Id. at 270-
71. His argument, however, implies that the judiciary ought not pass on claims that the 
executive branch has ignored a statute if it asserts that it has inherent power to take the 
action attacked in court. 
1991] INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 313 
2. Promoting Political Resolution of Policy Questions 
Because the United States cannot hope to persuade other nations 
to adopt environmentally sound practices without requiring United 
States businesses and citizens to meet the same standards, the ex-
ecutive branch and Congress need each other. 163 While the President 
and Congress do not always agree, they generally resolve disputes 
through political compromises. Congress needs the executive branch 
to negotiate solutions to environmental problems, and the executive 
needs Congress to enact treaties and pass legislation bringing the 
United States into compliance with international standards. For 
example, President Carter's success with MARPOL derived in part 
from the unity of design between him and Congress. 164 
Congressional committees regularly consult with executive branch 
officials about efforts, including negotiated efforts, to deal with in-
ternational environmental problems. 165 The Case Act reinforces this 
informal practice by requiring the President to report executive 
agreements to Congress. l66 Deference to the executive encourages 
the administration to conduct its own foreign policy rather than work 
with Congress. 
3. Promoting the Political Definition of the Scope of the 
President's Foreign Affairs Power 
Records of congressional hearings show not only consultation 
about policy, but also discussions about the appropriateness of leg-
islative restriction on the President's discretion in matters of foreign 
163 Hopson v. Kreps painfully illustrates the problem presented by the necessity to obey 
international norms ourselves in order to be able to successfully further them in the interna-
tional arena. 622 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1980). The International Whaling Commission (lWC), by 
eliminating the "native subsistence" exemption to its quotas, prohibited Eskimos from hunting 
the bowhead whale, an important part of their diet and culture. Id. at 1377. The Eskimos 
brought suit challenging the authority of the IWC to eliminate this exemption and the authority 
of the Secretary of Commerce to implement the new restriction. Id. The court held that the 
issue was justiciable and remanded the case. Id. at 1377-82. The D.C. Circuit earlier had 
reversed a district court order directing the Secretary of State to object to the IWC's zero 
quota for bowhead whales. See Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The court 
ruled that the district court's preliminary injunction was inappropriate, because filing an 
objection would have an irreversible consequence--serious damage to United States efforts 
to promote international protection of marine mammals. Id. at 956--57. 
164 See supra notes 105-14 and accompanying text. 
165 See, e.g., Whaling Policy Hearings, supra note 155, at 301, 312-320, 324 (discussing 
United States negotiating position in the IWC and related matters). 
166 1 U.S.C. § 112(b) (1988). 
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policy. For example, during the hearings on proposed amendments 
to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, Rep-
resentative Breaux asked Richard Frank, the administrator of the 
National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration, if he believed that 
the sanctions Congress had empowered the President to use to 
compel other nations to comply with international fishing conserva-
tion regulations would be more effective if they were made automatic 
instead of discretionary. 167 
Moreover, unlike in the war powers area, the President has 
signed, not vetoed, legislation such as the Packwood Amendment to 
the Pelly Magnuson Act,l68 MMPA,169 and the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1986,170 each of which limits his freedom. Courts should en-
force the political bargains these pieces of legislation represent. 
Special deference to the executive branch's unilateral reinterpreta-
tion of statutes only serves to undermine the political resolution of 
foreign policy and separation of powers questions. 
C. The Costs of the Chevron Rule 
Adherence to the rule limiting courts' deference to agency deci-
sions to those cases where neither the statutory language nor the 
legislative history resolves a question does have some costs in the 
foreign affairs area. Judge Oberdorfer seemed most concerned about 
embarrassing the President by ordering the repudiation of an agree-
ment that undercut a statute.171 Professor Michael Glennon has ex-
pressed the view, however, that the President should be embar-
rassed when he acts without legal authority in foreign affairs. 172 In 
any case, adherance to Chevron's limitations on deference may entail 
embarrassing a President whose foreign policy exceeds the bounds 
of a statute. 
More important, applying the limitations in Chevron to legislation 
requiring very specific actions, such as legislation requiring auto-
matic economic sanctions in defined circumstances, will limit the 
President's ability to respond flexibly to foreign policy situations. In 
167 Whaling Policy Hearings, supra note 155, at 312-13 (1979). Frank indicated that the 
administration had not yet formulated a position on that question, and that nonmandatory 
sanctions had proved effective in the past. 
168 15 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 1435 (Aug. 15, 1979). 
169 8 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 1618 (Oct. 21, 1972). 
170 22 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 1453 (Oct. 24, 1986). 
171 American Cetacean Soc'y V. Baldridge, 768 F.2d 426, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Oberdorfer, 
J., dissenting). 
172 Glennon, supra note 27, at 5, 11-20. 
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international environmental affairs, however, Congress has limited 
only the President's flexibility with the President's consent. Con-
gress and the President must decide through the legislative process 
whether flexible, ad hoc decisions or consistent, principled policy 
should govern foreign affairs. Congress, not the federal courts, 
should correct for overly rigid legislation. 173 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Courts should abandon extraordinary deference to executive 
branch interpretations of international environmental statutes. Ju-
dicially enforceable international environmental law will promote an 
appropriate and politically negotiated constitutional balance between 
the President and Congress in international environmental affairs. 
Moreover, it will enhance the legitimacy and long-term efficacy of 
whatever unilateral legislation Congress enacts and the President 
signs. 
173 The history of Japanese salmon fishing under the Marine Mammal Protection Act shows 
that Congress in fact has made such adjustments. Congress has amended the North Pacific 
Fisheries Act of 1954 twice in order to avoid restricting Japanese salmon fishing. See 16 
U.S.C. § 1034(b) (1988); 16 U.S.C. § lO34(b) (1988). These amendments implement negotiated 
agreements allowing the Japanese to fish for salmon in United States waters. See The Inter-
national Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean (INPCF), 4 U.S.T. 
380, T.I.A.S. No. 2786 (1952). The protocol amending this treaty in 1978 allowed the Japanese 
to fish for salmon inside the United States Exclusive Economic Zone. 30 U.S. T. 1095, T.I.A.S. 
No. 9242 (Apr. 25, 1978). See generally Kokechik Fishermen's Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 
839 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
